

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6419

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: SPC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON DETENTE

REF: USNATO 6401

MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW TEXT OF SPC CHAIRMAN KASTL'S REPORT ENTITLED "OBJECTIVES OF, OBSTACLES TO AND PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE" (C-M(74)81). NAC WILL HOLD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON REPORT NOVEMBER 20. MISSION WILL BE GUIDED BY INSTRUCTION IN STATE 249735 IN NOVEMBER 20 COUNCIL SESSION UNLESS DEPARTMENT WISHES TO MAKE ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON BASIS OF CHAIRMAN'S REPORT.

BEGIN TEXT.

OBJECTIVES OF, OBSTACLES TO AND PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE

REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT SENIOR LEVEL

AS INSTRUCTED BY THE COUNCIL ON 2ND OCTOBER, MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT, BEARING IN MIND THE STATEMENT OF THE US SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE US SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON 19TH SEPTEMBER ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC POLICY CONFIDENTIAL

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ADVISORY GROUP DATED 19TH JULY, ON "FUTURE TRENDS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS" (C-M(74)47). MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION IN THE COMMITTEE TOOK THE FORM OF THE LISTING OF QUESTIONS, WHICH SERVED TO INDICATE THE MAIN PREOCCUPATIONS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN

REGARD TO DETENTE. AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS IS ANNEXED TO THIS REPORT.

2. AT THE SUGGESTION OF MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON "TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE" ADDRESSED SOME ASPECTS OF DETENTE AS SEEN FROM THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SIDE. THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE OUTCOME OF THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP'S DISCUSSION (ANNEX OF THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP'S REPORT C-M(74)73).

3. THE BREADTH OF THE SUBJECT ADDRESSED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE INEVITABLY LED TO A WIDE RANGING DEBATE. CERTAIN THEMES WERE, HOWEVER, IDENTIFIABLE AND THESE ARE DESCRIBED BELOW.

4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL US/SOVIET RELATIONS, AND DETENTE AS A WHOLE: THE IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS WAS SEEN AS A NECESSARY UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH BROADER DETENTE COULD DEVELOP. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE TO SEE DETENTE SOLELY IN TERMS OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES THIS WOULD NOT SATISFY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. THEIR CONCEPT OF DETENTE

THIS DOCUMENT INCLUDES: 1 ANNEX

EMBRACED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST MORE GENERALLY, INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF. MOREOVER, DIFFICULTIES COULD ARISE IF THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT TO PRESS FOR WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN MATTERS WITHIN THE AREA OF THE ALLIANCE IN RETURN FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS OUTSIDE THAT AREA, OR TO EXTRACT, FOR EXAMPLE, ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS AS A PRICE FOR LOWERING TENSION.

5. THE SCALE OF OPTIONS AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE: THE CHOICE WITH WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO WISH TO CONFRONT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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WEST OF "DETENTE" ON THE ONE HAND, OR "COLD WAR" ON THE OTHER, WITH AN INCREASED RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION, WAS OVER-SIMPLIFIED. THIS SOVIET APPROACH WOULD SEEM TO SPRING FROM THEIR OWN SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER WITH THE WEST, AND THE WAY ALSO THAT THEY LOOK AT THEIR OTHER CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA. THE PROCESS OF EAST/WEST DETENTE MAY, HOWEVER, BE SET BACK IF UNDUE STRAIN IS PLACED UPON THE DEGREE OF IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS SO FAR ACHIEVED. WHAT WAS UNDUE STRAIN DEPENDED TO SOME EXTENT ON THE DEGREE OF SOVIET INTEREST IN AND NEED FOR DETENTE; WHICH IN TURN DEPENDED ON NUMBERS OF FACTORS, SUCH AS THE ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOTIVES OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THE CONSOLIDATION, THROUGH NEGOTIATION, OF A SITUATION OF STRATEGIC

BALANCE, PREFERABLY AT LOWER NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS. SO RENDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT LESS LIKELY, WAS A VITAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. BUT DETENTE, AS A POLICY OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, HAD ADDITIONAL AIRMS. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF THE WEIGHT AND DEGREE OF PRIORITY TO BE GIVEN TO THE EVENTUAL ACHIEVEMENT OF A MORE NORMAL EAST/WEST SITUATION IN EUROPE.

6. THE NEED FOR DETENTE TO BENEFIT BOTH EAST AND WEST:  
THERE WAS BROAD RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL ONLY BE READY TO CONTINUE ON A COURSE OF DETENTE IF THIS BRINGS SUBSTANTIAL RETURNS FOR THEM. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY SEE DETENTE AS LEADING TO EVER GREATER PRESSURES FOR CONCESSIONS IN AREAS WHERE THEY ARE UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY CHANGES, SUCH AS CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL SYSTEM OF THEIR EASTERN EUROPEAN EMPIRE, THEY WILL BE DISCOURAGED FROM CONTINUING WITH DETENTE. HOWEVER, TO WHAT EXTENT CAN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ACQUIESCE IN THE STATUS QUO WITHIN THE SOVIET EMPIRE AS A PRICE WHICH HAS TO BE, OR CAN BE PAID FOR DETENTE? CAN THE ECONOMIC EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP BE DIVORCED FROM THE POLITICAL ASPECT? FOR ITS PART, IS THE SOVIET UNION WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT THERE CANNOT BE CHANGE IN WESTERN POLICIES, SUCH AS THOSE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AIMED AT THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE?

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7. THE MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE DID NOT SEEK TO DEFINE SPECIFIC NATIONAL POSITIONS. THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE DID, HOWEVER, REFLECT SOME DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION WHICH MIGHT MERIT FURTHER EXAMINATION BY THE ALLIES FOR, BASED ON THE ATTACHED LIST OF QUESTIONS AND OTHER MATERIAL CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE, IS DESIGNED TO HIGHLIGHT CERTAIN SUBJECTS OF INTEREST, AND THEREBY TO ASSIST THE COUNCIL, SHOULD IT WISH TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF MINISTERS

TO PARTICULAR ISSUES FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER.

8. THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED AND IS SUBMITTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY.

END TEXT OF REPORT.

BEGIN TEXT OF ANNEX.

QUESTIONS ARISING IN AN ANALYSIS OF DETENTE PROSPECTS

1. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE SOVIET POLICIES OF DETENTE CENTRED ON BILATERAL SOVIET/US RELATIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, AND TO WHAT EXTENT DO THEY INVOLVE ASPECTS CONFIDENTIAL

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OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH COULD BE EXPLOITED? CAN "GLOBAL" DETENTE CONFLICT WITH THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN THE FIELD OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS?

2. WHAT MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OBJECTIVES ARE THERE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN PURSUIT OF DETENTE? WHAT ADVANTAGES CAN THE WEST GAIN? WHAT PRICE WILL THE WEST BE WILLIN TO PAY? HOW BEST CAN WE ENSURE THAT THE BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS WILL BE IN FAVOUR OF THE WEST?

3. WILL THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE LONG RUN, BE SATISFIED WITH A BALANCED MILITARY SITUATION, RENOUNCING A ONE-SIDED MILITARY SUPERIORITY? IS THERE A CHANGE IN SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SOVIET DOCTRINE ACCORDING TO WHICH:

- "SOVIET ARMAMENTS ONLY SERVE PEACE AND DETENTE AND THEREFORE THREATEN NO ONE";

- MILITARY POWER IS EQUAL TO POLITICAL INFLUENCE, AND POLITICAL PRESSURE CAN BE EXERCISED ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY?

4. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IF SOVIET INTEREST IN DETENTE IS ESSENTIALLY TACTICAL? CAN A POLICY OF BUILDING UP A NETWORK OF MUTUAL INTERESTS IN DETENTE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST STILL SERVE TO CONSOLIDATE DETENTE IF THE SOVIET APPROACH IS TACTICAL? TO WHAT EXTENT DO SOVIET POLICIES OF DETENTE DEPEND UPON THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP? WHAT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE POLICIES ARE THERE FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP?

5. THE SOVIET UNION IS TRYING TO PLACE PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE AN OVER-SIMPLIFIED ALTERNATIVE: "DETENTE OR COLD WAR". WHAT CAN THE WEST DO TO MAKE THE PUBLIC AWARE OF ITS MORE

DIFFERENTIATED DETENTE CONCEPT, WHICH CONSISTS OF A BROAD SCALE OF ACTIONS, STARTING WITH A BUSINESS-LIKE RELATIONSHIP THAT COULD DEVELOP INTO CLOSE CO-OPERATION IN ALL FIELDS?

6. CAN THE WEST RECOGNIZE A SOVIET DISTINCTION BETWEEN "EXTERNAL/ DETENTE WHERE THE SOVIET UNION HAS SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO PROMOTE REDUCTION OF TENSION  
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ON AN INTER-STATE LEVEL, AND "INTERNAL" DETENTE INVOLVING INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION? ASSUMING THE PROMOTION OF FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST TO BE AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF DETENTE POLICY FOR THE WEST, BECAUSE ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN REAL CONFIDENCE GROW, WHAT ARE THE POSSIBILITIES OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS AREA IN THE CSCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY? WHAT KIND OF FOLLOW-UP TO THE CSCE WOULD BEST CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS TOWARDS DETENTE?

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7. THE SOVIET UNION REJECTS THE SPREADING OF WESTERN IDEAS WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AS "ANTI-SOVIET" AND "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DETENTE", BUT EMPHASIZES AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO LAUNCH IDEOLOGICAL OFFENSIVES IN THE WEST AS PART OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE". ASSUMING THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS ITS CONCEPT, HOW FAR SHOULD THE WEST INVERSELY INSIST ON COMPETITION OF IDEAS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD?

8. WHAT IS THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT ECONOMIC-TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS?

9. IN VIEW OF THE ASSUMED LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES OF THE

SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY HAVING REGARD TO ITS ARMAMENT POLICY, IS IT IN WESTERN INTEREST TO GRANT CREDITS AT REDUCED INTEREST RATES IN ADDITION TO THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW FROM WEST TO EAST? OR SHOULD ECONOMIC EXCHANGES TAKE PLACE ON A PURELY COMMERCIAL BASIS?

10. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE ECONOMIC BALANCE SHIFTED IN FAVOUR OF THE EAST IN VIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST OWING TO ENERGY, RAW MATERIAL, FINANCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, AND TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THIS REDUCE THE POSSIBLE LEVER AFFECT OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION FOR POLITICAL IMPROVEMENTS?  
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HOW IMPORTANT STILL TO THE SOVIET UNION IS DETENTE AND, FOLLOWING FROM THIS, WHAT IS THE MARGIN WITHIN WHICH THERE IS ROOM TO EXERCISE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT PRESSURES ARE POSSIBLE AND REALISTIC?

11. WILL THE SOVIET UNION BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE INCLUDING ALL ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASPECTS, AND NOT TO ATTACK IT AS BEING "CONTRARY TO DETENTE"?

12. AFTER THE END OF CSCE, WILL THE SOVIET UNION INSIST ON BRANDING AS "REVANCHIST" AND "ANTI-DETENTE" ANY POLICY AIMED AT THE EVENTUAL EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND - ON THIS BASIS - AT REUNIFICATION. HOW CAN THIS BEST BE DEALT WITH?

13. ARE THE SOVIETS PREPARED TO CONCEDE THE STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL APPLICATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN? ARE THEY PREPARED TO ALLOW BERLIN TO BE TAKEN AS A YARDSTICK FOR THEIR RESOLUTION TO PURSUE DETENTE?

14. WILL THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE COURSE OF DETENTE, BE PREPARED TO RENOUNCE OR MODIFY ITS LATENT HEGEMONIAL ASPIRATIONS CONCERNING WESTERN EUROPE?

15. THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES A EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM. HOW SHOULD THE WEST DEAL WITH THIS CONCEPT? FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, IS THE ALLIANCE APPROACH OF A REDUCTION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION, ESPECIALLY BY MBFR, AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE?

16. TO WHAT EXTENT DO CURRENT EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS, E.G. ON CBMS AND IN THE MBFR, RISK CREATING A SPECIAL AREA OR AREAS IN EUROPE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL REGIMES, AND WHAT ARE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THIS?

17. THE MORE NUMEROUS THE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BECOME, THE MORE STRONGLY SOVIET CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING IN ORDER TO SCREEN THEIR OWN PUBLIC AND

THAT OF THEIR ALLIES FROM WESTERN INFLUENCES. WHAT WEIGHT  
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION  
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AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN ASSESSING THE  
PROSPECTS FOR AND DEGREE OF SUCCESS OF DETENTE POLICIES?  
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A CHANGE IN THE PRESENT FORM OF  
SOVIET HEGEMONY OVER EASTERN EUROPE? WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR  
A MODIFICATION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE UNDER THE INFLUENCE  
OF DETENTE POLICIES?

18. WHAT IS THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE  
DETENTE PROCESS OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN EUROPEAN  
COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCES (FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AUSTRIA)?

19. WHAT ARE THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION PROBLEMS WE ARE  
LIKELY TO FACE IN THE FUTURE IF THE PRESENT PROCESS OF DETENTE  
CONTINUES? WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR MAINTAINING THE  
NECESSARY PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF DEFENCE  
SPENDING? WILL IT BE POLITICALLY POSSIBLE TO INSIST ON PRESENT  
WESTERN REQUIREMENTS IN, FOR EXAMPLE, CSCE, IF SUCH INSISTANCE  
APPEARS TO BE THREATENING DETENTE? IS THERE ANYTHING WE SHOULD  
BE DOING TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF  
SUCH A SITUATION ARISING?

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